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IN 1 _ UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL H. SUHR,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No.

THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendant/Appellant.

Prioritv No. 16

920218-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992), providing fox jurisdiction in
the couiw of appeals over cases transferred from the Supreme
Court,

Jurisdiction of this appeal was conferred on the Supreme

Court by Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(j) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain

fr- jury's finding that the steer entered the highway through
either of two alleged defects in the adjacent fence and thus that
UDOT's negligence proximately caused Suhr's injuries.
Standard of Review: The denial of a motion for judgment
no*

thstanding the verdict based on insufficiency of the

eviaence is reviewed for correctness, applying the same standard
as the trial court: whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, there is competent evidence to
support it.

In challenging such a denial, the appellant must

marshall all of the evidence supporting the verdict and show that
reasonable people would not conclude that the evidence supports
the verdict.

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 156

(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988);
King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the First
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Frank L. Gunnell
presiding, upon a jury verdict, awarding $118,814.70 in damages
to the plaintiff-appellee Suhr against the defendant-appellant
UDOT for property damage and personal injuries sustained by Suhr
when his semi-truck hit a steer on an interstate highway,
allegedly as a result of UDOT's negligent maintenance of the
fence bordering the highway.
Course of the Proceedings & Disposition Below
A jury trial was held from December 17 - 20, 1991. At
the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, UDOT moved for a directed
verdict.
the jury.

The court denied the motion and submitted the case to
By special verdict, the jury found UDOT 85% at fault

and Suhr 15% at fault for the accident and resulting injuries.
The jury awarded special damages of $83,860 and general damages
of $50,000, for a total of $133,860.
On January 7, 1992, after deducting for the
2

contributory negligence and adding pre-judgment interest and
costs, the court entered a judgment on the verdict for
$118,814.70.

UDOT had moved for a judgment notwithstanding the

verdict on December 30, 1992. On January 21, 1992, the court
denied the motion.

UDOT filed its notice of appeal on January

30, 1992.
Statement of the Facts
The following facts are recited in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, marshalling all of the evidence in
support of the verdict.
On November 8, 1988, plaintiff-appellee Michael H. Suhr
was driving a semi-truck nortl^ound or "r.terstate 84 in Box Elder
County near the Utah-Idaho border when his truck hit an 800 pound
steer that was standing in the outside lane.

Suhr's truck was

damaged and he sustained personal injuries in the accident.
At the point of the accident, the highway was bordered
on both sides by a pasture, which was separated from the highway
by wire fencing.

The highway consisted of two lanes in each

direction, divided by a wide center median.

Just north of the

accident site, a box culvert ran underneath and perpendicular to
the highway, allowing cattle and other farm traffic to travel
from one side of the highway to another.

Where it crossed the

median strip, the culvert was bordered on both sides by fencing.
(For a general layout of the highway, see Plaintiff's Exhibit
Nos. 5, 4 and 13, photocopies of which are attached as Addendum
2.)

All of the fencing was maintained by UDOT.
3

Suhr filed a complaint alleging that UDOT had
negligently designed and maintained the fencing and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of the steer's entry onto the
highway and thus the accident.

On UDOT's motion, the "livestock

owner or operatorff was also included on the special verdict form
for purposes of assessing fault.

R. 332.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict,
the evidence adduced at trial showed that there were two
defective areas in the fence near the accident site:

an area on

the east (northbound) side of the highway, where water erosion
had created a gap beneath the fence, and an area in the median
section of the culvert where a combination of sagging of the
fence wires and accretion of the ground level shortened the fence
to 36 inches from the standard 52 inch height.
Tom Wilcock testified that he went to the scene of the
accident the day after it occurred and identified the steer as
one of his own.

Tr. 320.1 Wilcock testified that he had been

operating the ranch next to the highway since April 1982 and that
he kept cattle in the pasture on the northbound side of the
highway 30 to 40 days a year in the fall before snowfall. Tr.
318.

He testified that cattle liked to stick their heads in the

gap underneath the fence to rub their necks, and that the bottom
of the fence was bent outward at the gap.

Tr. 335. According to

Wilcock, it was "possible" for an animal the size of the steer

1

Because the trial transcript was paginated separately from
the remaining trial record, it is referred to as "Tr.
".
4

involved in the collision to have gone under the fence at the
location of the gap,

Tr. 336. Wilcock stated that in his

opinion it was also possible for a steer to leap over the
shortened fence in the median section of the culvert.

Id.

He

testified that there was a gate on the southbound side of the
culvert that was closed at the time of the accident.

Tr. 331.

Suhr called Clinton Burtf a rancher of over 40 years of
experience, as an expert witness.

Burt had never seen the

accident site, but testified hypothetically that it was
"possible" for an 800 pound steer to work its way under a 20 inch
clearance between the ground and a field fence.
alL

Tr. 359. Burt

:estified that he "imagined" th~: an 800 pound steer could

jump over a 36 inch high fence "if there was no other place to
go.

It would have to be kind of boxed in."

Tr. 360. According

to Burt, cattle get nervous when boxed in and can also be
"spooked" by noises.

Tr. 362-363.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Stephens investigated
the accident on the night it occurred and the following day.

He

testified that "[i]t is possible, if that fence was up like knee
high, a steer of that size . . . might be able to push their way
underneath and traverse through it." Tr. 86.
There was no direct evidence, however, that the steer
actually did enter the highway through either of the two
defective areas in the fence.

To the contrary, Trooper Stephens,

who had 30 years of experience with livestock, testified that he
checked the fence on both sides of the highway and saw no place
5

where a steer could have entered the highway.

Tr. 79-82.

He

testified that he did not measure the gap# that it "did not
appear to be a problem area# and that

lf

[i]f I would have had any

indication at all that a steer had gone under the particular
portion of the fence I would have been alerted to it."
86.

Tr. 85-

He testified that he saw no displacement of the vegetation

near the gap, no dig marks, no cow droppings, no hair on the
fence, no scratches on the steer's hide, or any other sign that
the steer entered the highway through the gap.

Tr. 94-96.

Similarly, Rodney Arbon, a UDOT employee responsible
for maintaining the fence, inspected the fence on both sides of
the highway for at least a mile in either direction from the
accident site, and saw no place where the steer could have
entered the highway.

Tr. 172-73. Arbon testified that the gap

between the bottom of the fence and the ground was actually only
2 to 3 inches, although the deepest point of the eroded area,
which was on the far side of the fence from the highway, was 16
inches.

Tr. 141-145, 197.
The only other evidence of the actual dimensions of the

gap was photographs taken in the spring following the accident.
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 18, 19 & 20, photocopies of which
are attached as Addendum 3.)

Tr. 302-303. Although the

photographs were admitted into evidence on Suhr's motion, Suhr
argued in closing that because the view of the gap in the
photographs was partially obstructed by vegetation and the angle
from which they were taken, their probative value was limited.
6

Tr. 651.
At the same time, unrebutted evidence showed that the
steer could have entered the highway by some other means. Arbon
testified that, at the time of the collision, Wilcock had cattle
in two other pastures in the vicinity of the accident.
75.

Tr. 170-

Arbon, who was a rancher himself, further testified that

cattle have a tendency to roam, and that therefore the steer did
not necessarily escape from the pasture closest to the accident
site.

Id.

This testimony was unrebutted by Wilcock or any other

witness or evidence.
Wilcock testified that he drove cattle directly through
the culvert every year and that the fence had "always been saggy
through there."

Tr. 323-24.

Similarly, Arbon testified that

UDOT had dumped fill into the gap several times a year for many
years.

Tr. 137-39. There was no evidence, however, that any

cattle had ever previously jumped the culvert fence or escaped
through the gap underneath the fence.

To the contrary, Arbon

testified that only one steer had previously escaped in the
vicinity of the accident.

That escape occurred when a portion of

the fence had been taken down by power company employees working
in the area.

Tr. 206.

In addition, Burt, Suhr's cattle expert, repeatedly
stated that when cattle are boxed in and spooked, they not only
will jump a 36 inch fence but will sometimes go over even the top
of a person.

Tr. 362, 365. This testimony supported that of

Arbon that he had seen cattle jump a fence as high as five feet.
7

Tr. 162-63. Burt also declined to opine that the steer jumped
the fence in the area of the culvert, stating, "I don't know how
I could say it jumped out at that spot.
my life.

I've watched cattle all

They don't particularly pick any spot.

out at the most unlikely places."

They can get

Tr. 364. Pressed further,

Burt asked candidly, "Who knows where it got out?"

Tr. 366.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, UDOT moved
for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), U. R. Civ. P., based on
the insufficiency of the evidence to show that the steer had
escaped through, and thus the accident was caused by, either of
the two alleged defects.

Tr. 544. The court denied the motion.

Tr. 563.
By special verdict, the jury found that UDOT was
negligent as alleged by Suhr and that the negligence proximately
caused Suhr to sustain injuries.
was 15% contributorily negligent.

The jury also found that Suhr
The jury found special damages

of $83,860 and general damages of $50,000, for a total of
$133,860.

After deducting for the contributory negligence and

adding pre-judgment interest and costs, the court entered a
judgment on the verdict for $118,814.70.
UDOT moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
under Rule 50(b), U. R. Civ. P., again based on the insufficiency
of the evidence to support the jury's finding that UDOT's claimed
negligence proximately caused Suhr's injuries.
court denied the motion.

R. 402.

8

R. 338. The

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr, the
evidence adduced at trial failed to support Suhr's theory that
the steer had been in the pasture on the northbound side of the
highway and that it escaped through either one of the two alleged
defects in the fence bordering that side of the highway.

Thus,

Suhr failed to prove an essential element of his claim, i.e.,
that the alleged negligence of UDOT in maintaining the fence
actually caused the accident.
There was no direct evidence adduced at trial as to how
or where the steer actually entered the highway.

The

circumstantial evidence was, at most, equally consistent with the
view that the steer entered the highway from some other pasture
or through some other means as that it escaped through either of
the allegedly defective areas in the fence.

Thus, the evidence

established mere possibilities as to how the steer escaped and
Suhr's theory of causation was based on complete speculation and
conjecture.

The judgment and jury verdict should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT SUHR'S THEORY THAT THERE
WAS A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE AND THE ACCIDENT

An essential element of a cause of action in negligence
is causation.

Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991);

Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); Gregory v.
Fourthwest Investments Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988).
9

Thus, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence,
not only that the defendant was negligent in a manner that could
have injured the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was injured,
but that the proven negligence was both the actual and proximate
cause of the injury.

Here, although reasonable persons might

have differed as to whether UDOT was negligent in maintaining the
fence that bordered the highway where the accident occurred,
there was insufficient evidence to support Suhr's theory that the
steer entered the highway as a result of the alleged negligence.
Thus, Suhr failed to prove the essential connection between the
alleged negligence of UDOT and his injury.
A.

At Most. The Evidence Was Equally Consistent With
Other Explanations As The Theory That The Alleged
Negligence Caused The Accident

The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of causation
in the context of a vehicle-animal collision in Rhiness v.
Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 (Utah 1970).

There, the plaintiff's car hit

one of several of the defendant's horses that had escaped onto
the highway.

The horses were normally kept in a pasture next to

a railroad track adjoining the highway.

The pasture was

separated from the track and the highway by a fence which had a
gate, which was partially open at the time of the collision.

The

plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in failing
to put a lock on the gate to prevent others who used the gate
from leaving it open.
Noting that the evidence showed that livestock had
10

escaped from the pasture four times in the 25 years before the
accident, but never before through the gate, the Supreme Court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant.

In so holding,

the Court stated, "The mere fact that the animals escaped from
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, to
justify the submission of defendant's negligence to the jury."
Id.
The principle followed in Rhiness also governs this
case.

Like the plaintiff in Rhiness. Suhr adduced evidence at

trial of a defect or defects in the fence t:
through which livestock could have escaped.

ring the highway
As in Rhiness.

however, there was simply no evidence that the animal actually
escaped through the allegedly defective areas.

Indeed, the

evidence here is even weaker than in Rhiness. where the alleged
defect was an unlocked and open gate which the horse would not
have had to jump over or wriggle under to traverse.

In the face

of other possible explanations for the horses' escape, the
Supreme Court in Rhiness rejected the plaintiff's theory as to
causation.

Similarly, Suhr's hypothesis should be rejected here.

Rhiness was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in Vanderwater v. Hatch. 835 F.2d 239 (10th
Cir. 1987).

Vanderwater involved a collision between a

motorcycle and a cow on a "stretch of rural highway in Northern
Utah adjacent to a fenced past
yearling cows.

ff

in which Hatch kept 25 head of

Hatch also kept 120 head of cattle, including a

few yearlings, on an open range that crossed the highway within a
11

mile of the accident site. Witnesses to the accident reported
seeing as many as 15 yearlings on the highway just before the
accident.

Unlike Rhiness. however, there was no evidence of any

defects in the pasture fence.
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the
trial court erred in denying a request for a res ipsa loquitur
instruction, holding that the requirement that the injury was
more probably than not the result of negligence was not met.
"The evidence in the instant case is at least as consistent with
the view that the cow involved in the accident drifted in from
open range as with the view that it escaped from defendant's
fenced pasture.

In light of the statutory exclusion [exempting

open range livestock from the requirement that owners prevent
livestock from entering upon a fenced public highway], we do not
believe there is a reasonable basis here for concluding the
injury is more likely than not the result of negligence."

Id. at

242-43.
In so holding, the court relied on Rhiness. While it
did not directly address the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and
was factually distinguishable, the court stated, "Rhiness at
least implicitly rejects the proposition plaintiff Vanderwater is
advancing in the instant case, that common knowledge is a
sufficient substitute for evidence identifying the cause of the
animals' escape."
Although Vanderwater arose in the context of a request
for a res ipsa loquitur instruction, its reasoning is helpful
12

here.

As in Vanderwater. the evidence here is at least as

consistent with the view that the steer entered the freeway
through some other means as that it entered as a result of the
defendant's negligence.

The additional evidence of negligence

adduced by Suhr adds nothing to his claim in the absence of
evidence of causation.

Just as the evidence did not warrant a

legal -resumption of negligence in Vanderwater. it does not
support a factual inference of causation here.

See also Dailey

v. Lawson. 119 A.2d 684, 685 (Vt. 1956) (reversing judgment upon
: -y veri.'ct for the plaintiff stating, "The mere fact of the
poor condition of the fence would not warrant a finding by the
jury that the hose escaped over or through that portion of the
fence"); Granger v. Tremblay. 28 A.2d 696, 697 (Vt. 1942)
(reversing judgment upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff because
there was "no evidence tending to show how the horse happened to
be upon the highway" although the evidence did show that a gate
to a pasture adjacent to the highway containing ether horses
owned by the defendant was open).
The Utah Supreme Court has applied this reasoning in
other contexts as well.

In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697

P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), for example, the Court upheld a summary
judgment for the defendant, in whose hotel the plaintiff's
decedent was robbed and murdered.

The plaintiffs in Mitchell had

adduced extensive evidence of numerous breaches in the hotel's
security that could have allowed a potential assailant access to
the victim's room where the murder took place.
13

The Court found

that "plaintiffs have elicited sufficient evidence . . . to raise
material issues of fact with respect to whether defendants were
negligent in providing hotel security."

But, the Court

continued,
the inquiry does not end there.
Demonstrating material issues of fact with
respect to defendants' negligence is not
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if
there is no evidence that establishes a
direct causal connection between that alleged
negligence and the injury.
The Court noted the total absence of eyewitness or other direct
evidence as how the murderer actually gained access to Mitchell's
room.

It concluded that the evidence was equally consistent with

the view that the murderer entered the room at Mitchell's
invitation as that the murderer obtained a passkey as a result of
the hotel's lax security.

"Any supposition," the Court stated,

"as to the manner of entrance to Mitchell's room or the identity
of the assailant would be totally speculative.

A jury cannot be

permitted to engage in such speculation."
Similarly, in Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of
Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), the Court upheld a
judgment for the operator of a storage facility in which a fire
broke out, destroying the plaintiff's grain.

The plaintiff

presented no evidence of the actual origin of the fire, relying
on a presumption that a loss of or damages to bailed goods is due
to the bailee's negligence.

The Court affirmed the trial court's

ruling that the defendant did not have exclusive control over the
storage facility and that therefore there was no legal
14

presumption that the fire occurred as a result of the defendant's
negligence.

Moreover, although there was considerable evidence

of conduct by the defendant that could have caused the fire,
there was no evidence as to how the fire actually started.
Court stated,

The

fl

We readily concede that the record contains

evidence of carelessness on the Coop's part, but there is also
evidence of the Stahelis' negligence and, indeed, the possibility
of negligence on the part of third parties.11

Concluding that the

judgment should be affirmed, the Court stated, "When the
proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim
fails as a matter of law."

See also Sumsion v. Strcator-Smith

Inc.. 103 Utah 44, 52, 132 P.2d 680,

(1943) (J. Wolfe)

("While deductions may be based on probabilities, the evidence
must do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a
probability.

Where there are probabilities the other way equally

. ::.ore potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury
should not be permitted to speculate.").
Just as there was no direct evidence as to how the
murderer gained access to the victim's room in Mitchell or how
the fire was started in Staheli, there was no direct evidence as
to how or where the steer entered the highway in this case. The
only witness to the accident was Suhr himself, who testified that
when he first saw the steer it was simply standing in the outside
lane of the highway.

Tr. 380. Just as there was no known

eyewitness to the murder in Rhiness or to the fire in Staheli.
there was no eyewitness to the steer's entry onto the freeway
15

here.
Moreover, as in Mitchell and Staheli. the evidence
relied upon by Suhr is equally consistent with other possible
explanations of the accident.

To conclude that the cause of the

accident was UDOT's alleged negligence would require utter
speculation and conjecture.
In closing argument, Suhr argued that Wilcock's
testimony that the fence in the area of the gap was bent out
constituted circumstantial evidence from which the jury could
infer that the steer escaped through the gap.

Tr. 649. Notably

absent from Wilcock's testimony, however, was any claim that the
fence was unbent before the accident.

In light of Wilcock's

statement that cattle liked to rub their necks there, Tr. 335, no
inference that the fence was previously unbent can reasonably be
drawn.

Thus, even viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr,

the evidence does not fairly or reasonably support the inference
that the steer escaped through the gap.
Suhr offered various explanations for the absence of
any affirmative evidence of where or how the steer escaped.

For

example, he contended that the ground surface was too dry for the
steer to have left any tracks and that the fence immediately
above the gap was to smooth to scratch the steer's hide or catch
its hair.

Tr. 649. While it may have been within the jury's

prerogative to accept these explanations, the evidence
nevertheless failed to support Suhr's theory that the steer
actually did escape through one of the defective areas.
16

Focusing on the possibility that the steer jumped the
shortened fence in the area of the culvert, Suhr attempted in
closing argument to paint a "picture" of the steer trapped in the
culvert at near dark with semis "racing back and forth over the
tunnel at 60 miles an hour."

Tr. 653-56. While it may have

provided compelling drama, this explanation of how and where the
steer escaped was completely unsupported by any evidence.
Indeed, the fact that trucks had been passing over the culvert
and that the fence had been in the same condition for years, as
Wilcock testified, Tr. 323-24, tended to refute this explanation.
Moreover, even assuming that the conditions necessary
to cause a steer to jump the fence, as established by Suhr's
cattle expert, were in fact present, there was no evidence
tending to show that the shortened height of the fence had any
causal connection to the steer's escape.

To the contrary,

Clinton Burt testified that a steer the age and size of the one
involved in the collision was capable not only of jumping a three
foot fence, but "sometimes it might even be me" or "anybody else
thci~ is there."

Tr. 362, 365.

In the same vein, Rodney Arbon

testified that he had seen cattle jump a fence as high as five
feet.

Tr. 162-63. Arbon further testified that there was

another culvert going underneath the freeway (thus also providing
the conditions that Suhr contended caused the steer to jump) only
one mile up the road.

Tr. 172. Certainly, if the steer could

have jumped over a person, there is no basis for concluding that
the shortened area of fence was the cause in fact of the steer's
17

escape, even assuming the existence of conditions sufficient to
cause a steer to leap over a fence in the first place.
Realizing this flaw in his theory after the defendant's
closing argument, Suhr made a last minute pitch in rebuttal that
if steers can jump five foot fences and the state erects 4'4"
fences, then n[i]f that isn't negligence I don't know what is,"
Tr. 681. Since Suhr adduced no evidence of any prior escapes
over 4'4" fences or of the likelihood that a steer will jump such
a fence, there was no competent evidence on which the jury could
have based such a finding of negligence.

Moreover, just as the

evidence was insufficient to support Suhr's other theories as to
how the steer escaped, it was insufficient to show that the steer
actually did jump the 4'4" fence.
Not only was there insufficient evidence to support
Suhr's theory that the steer escaped through one of the two
allegedly defective areas in the fence bordering the pasture on
the northbound side of the highway, there was insufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that the steer was even in
that pasture before its escape.

Notably absent from the

testimony of Tom Wilcock, the owner of the steer, was any claim
that the steer had indeed been enclosed in the pasture on the
northbound side of the highway.

At the same time, Arbon

testified that Wilcock had cattle in two other pastures in the
same vicinity at the time of the accident and that cattle have a
habit of roaming.

Tr. 170-75. While, again, it may have been

within the jury's prerogative to disregard Arbon's testimony, the
18

evidence nevertheless failed to establish the steer's whereabouts
before its escape.
In closing, Suhr's counsel argued that both Arbon and
Trooper Stephens had checked the fence "up and down the
interstate" and found n[e]verything else in great shape,"
implying that the two allegedly defective areas were the only
possibilities.

Tr. 683. Of course, this argument ignores the

fact that neither Arbon nor Stephens viewed either of the two
allegedly defective areas as potential escape routes either.
Even so, the testimony of Arbon and Stephens established only
t

rhere were no other defects in rhe fence within about a mile

ot Lhe ^-cident site.

It did not diminish the possibility that

the steer escaped through some other means (e.g., by jumping the
standard height fence) or that it escaped further up or down the
road from one of Wilcock's other pastures.
As shown by Rhiness. Vanderwater. Mitchell and Staheli,
the essential causal link between the negligence and the injury
cannot be reasonably inferred by the existence of the injury and
the defect alone.

There must be some additional evidence, either

direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the
negligence in fact caused the injury.

Suhr failed to adduce any

such evidence and therefore the judgment and jury verdict must be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
Suhr failed to adduce any evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that established more than a mere possibility
19

that the steer escaped from the pasture on the northbound side of
the highway adjacent to the accident site or through either one
of the two allegedly defective areas in the fence bordering that
pasture.

At least equally likely was the possibility that the

steer escaped from some other pasture or through some other means
not attributable to UDOT.

Thus, Suhr's theory of causation was

based on complete speculation and conjecture, and the judgment
and jury verdict should therefore be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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June, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attoasney General
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DEBRA J.LMDORE
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM 1

Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield t Thome #1288
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone: 723-3404
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX
ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL H- SUHR,
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendant.

Civil No. 900000191PI
Judge F. L. Gunnel1

Trial in the above matter came on regularly before the court
on the 17th day of December, 1991. The plaintiff appeared
personally and was represented by his attorneys Ben H. Hadfield
and Jeff R Thome; defendant State of Utah by its Department of
Transportation appeared and was represented by its attorney, Mark
Ward.

A jury of eight people was regularly empaneled and sworn

t- try said action.

Witnesses on the part of plaintiff and

defendant were sworn and examined, and all evidence was submitted
by the parties.

After four days of trial and having considered

the evidence, arguments of counsel and instructions of the court,

case .*

c

f?rmicu

a-v?/

Suhr vs. State of Utah
Judgment on Verdict

the jury retired to consider the verdict, and after deliberating
approximately four and one-half hours, returned its special
verdict and answered the interrogatories as follows:
1.
2.

3.
5.
6.

7.

Was defendant State of Utah negligent as
alleged?
Answer:
If defendant State of Utah was negligent
as alleged, did such negligence
proximately cause the plaintiff, Michael
H. Suhr to sustain injuries?
Answer:
Was the livestock owner or operator
negligent as alleged?

Yes

Answer:

No

Was plaintiff Michael H. Suhr negligent
as alleged?
Answer:

Yes

If plaintiff Michael H. Suhr was
negligent as alleged, did such negligence
proximately cause the plaintiff Michael
H. Suhr to sustain injuries:
Answer:

Yes

Assuming the combined negligence of all
parties is equal to 100%, what percentage
is attributable to:
A.

State of Utah

85%

B.

Livestock owner or operator

C.

Michael H. Suhr

0%
15%
100%

8.

Yes

What amounts, if any, would compensate
plaintiff for his damages, if any, which he
sustained as a result of the accident?
A.

Property Damages.
1.

Damage to truck

$

4,000.00

2.

Towing Charges

$

1,200.00

2

Suhr vs. State of Utah
Judgment on Verdict

B.

Special Damages.
1.

Past medical expenses

$

5,100.00

2.

Past lost earnings

$

8,560.00

3.

Future medical expenses

$ 15,000.00

4.

Future loss of earnings

$ 50,000.00

5.

Future loss of household
services
TOTAL PROPERTY AND SPECIAL
DAMAGES
C.

-0-

$ 83,860.00

General Damages

$ 50,000.00

TOTAL VERDICT

$133.860.00

Pursuant to Section 78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, as
amended, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the
rate of 10% per annum from the date of the accident on
$18,860.00, the amount of all special damages incurred to the
date of trial. This interest totals $5,922.00 as of December 30,
1991, which amount should be added to the judgment, for a total
judgment of $139,782.00.

Pursuant to Utah law regarding

comparative fault, the total judgment should be reduced by 15%,
the amount of plaintiff's comparative fault, which is equal to
$20,967.30.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORI

J5D, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED that plaintiff Michael H. Suhr shall have judgment

3

fiuhr vs. State of Utah
Judgment on Verdict

against the State of Utah for the total amount of $118,814.70.
In addition, plaintiff shall be awarded his costs pursuant to
Rule 54(d) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This judgment shall

bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date hereof.
DATED this

lp

day of -©eeemSeT/y 19MT.
BY THE COURT;

F. L. GUNNELL
DISTRICT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE QF MAIMPG
In accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, a copy of the within Judgment on the Verdict was
mailed to defendant's attorney, Mark Ward, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
by depositing in the United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy
of said proposed Judgment on the Verdict, on the a>''W\ day of
December, 1991.

tr/1:suhr.jud
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Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #1288
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL H. SUHR,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
)
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

)

Civil No. 900000191

This matter came before the Court pursuant to the
defendant's Motion filed in accordance with 50(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant submitted a supporting

Memorandum, a Memorandum in Opposition was filed by the
plaintiff, and a Reply Memorandum was filed by the defendant. The
Court reviewed these documents prior to the hearing which was
held on January 8, 1992, beginning at 10:00 o'clock a.m.

At said

time, the plaintiff was represented by Ben H. Hadfield of Mann,
Hadfield and Thorne and the defendant, State of Utah, was
represented by J. Mark Hard, Assistant Attorney General.

The

Court heard arguments from each counsel concerning the Motion for

MICROFILMED

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and then issued its decision
from the bench.
In its ruling, the Court noted that the issue was whether
there was sufficient evidence that was placed before the jury to
satisfy it by preponderance of the evidence that there was in
fact negligence, that there was in fact causation, and that there
were in fact damages.

The Court observed that there were

sufficient instructions on causation to assist the jury in
understanding what the Court expected them to find before they
could make a finding of liability.

There were specifically three

separate jury instructions defining and explaining proximate
cause.

The Court is satisfied that the jurors reviewed those

instructions and applied those against the evidence.

The Court

is of the opinion that the jury understood that there had to be a
relationship of causation and negligence on the part of the
State.

The Court is further of the opinion that the Court must

now consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that there is
sufficient evidence to show to the satisfaction of a jury, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the damages were proximately
caused by defendant's negligence.

The Court conferred with the

jurors after the trial had been concluded.

2

The jurors noted that

while there was testimony that the steer could have walked over
the fence in one location and crawled under the fence at another
location, the fact that the steer was hit in the immediate
vicinity, very close to the defects in the fence, added more
weight to the fact that the steer, by a preponderance of the
evidence, got over or under the fence at those locations where
there was negligence.
question.

This then relates to the proximate cause

This Court is of the opinion that there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to find as it did.

The defendant's Motion

for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict .: denied.
DATED this

^y,l

day of January, 1992.

F. L. GUNNELL
DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
ff
day of January, 1992, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Judgment
Notwithstanding Verdict to J. Mark Ward, Attorney for Defendant,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

Secretary ^ '
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